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STATDDT OJ' IUTURK fa CASB 
Tbi• 1• a crillinal ca•• wherein tbe 
defendant waa cbar1ed and con•icted of tbe 
felon1 of e•be••leaent tor •illfullJ ta11-
in1 to return a rented t1pewriter of a 
••lue exceedtn1 $10.00 to it• owner w1tb-
in ten cta1• att•r tbe rental asree .. nt 
had expired, in Yiolation of Utab Code 
Annotated Section 78-17-5 (Supp. 1961), 
wbicb readll, in part •• pertinent hereto, 
as tollon: 
Bw.ry person wbo bas leased 
or rented a aotur vehicle, trail-
er, appliance, equ1P119nt, tool or 
other valuable tbing, and wbo will-
fully tail• to return th• •aae to 
its owner within ten days after 
the lease or rental agre ... nt baa 
expired, is guilty ot eabezaleaent. 
Tbe defendant waived jury trial and 
the aatter was tried to the Court without 
a Jury. At tbe end of tbe State•a case 
defendant aoYed to di••1•• upon ground& 
that the State failed to preaeot auffi-
cieat evidence of an eaaential ele .. nt of 
the cr1•• charged, to-wit, tbat defen-
dant'• failure was willful (B. 20-21). 
Defendant also llOYed to disaiaa on the 
ground& earlier relied upon in aupport of 
bis aotion to quash, to-wit, a typewriter 
is not one of the ite .. included within 
the statute (~. ~0-21). 
The trial court reeerved rulina on 
these aotiona until after presentation of 
the defendant'• case. At the cloae o1 
defendant 'a caae the court denied tbe llO-
tions, found defendant guilty, and sen-
tenced bill for the statutory tera of aotL 
l••• tban one year nor aore than ten 1eara 
iapriaonaent in tbe atate priaon, wbere cl-. 
fendant 1• now aervinc bi• tera. 
STATBllElrl' OJ' FACTS 
On October 30, 1914, the defendant 
entered xa ... 1er'a Sports ~tore and execu-
ted a ":aental-Loan Acreeaent and Record," 
aubaequently introduced by the State in 
tile Trial Court u State'• Exhibit ••A". 
(ll. 'and 20). Thi• ap-eeaent wu e.xaou-
ted in the defendant'• own correct aaae, 
Ken Kaaepper (R. ' and 30 allll State'• Bx-
bibit "A''.), and reflected. hi• correct 
boae and bua1neaa addr••• provided Yolwa-
tarllJ by defendant and later verified by 
the State'• wltneaa, Don Ka ... J•r (R. 1-
10 and 13-1'). 3 
The defendant was en1aged in a ao1n1 
s1gn paintina business at tbe rreeport 
Center io Clearfield, Davia County, Utab, 
accordin1 to bis own te•t111<>ny (R 22-33), 
and verified by tbe teatiaony of the State'• 
onlJ witne•• <•· 13-14). H• rented tbe 
typewriter for the purpoae of typin• buai-
aeas correapondence <•· 22). 
Tbe fore1otn1 fact• are wuU.aputed. 
Tbe balance of tblA• State .. nt of Fact• •111 
be divided into two parta to clarifJ the 
iaauea now before tb.ua Court. TM lint 
part •111 be a •Ullll&t1on of the te•tillOnJ 
of the State•• only w1toeaa, Don 1a ... 1er. 
Tb• aecond •111 be a ammatioo of tile , .. _ 
tillODJ of tbe clefeodant•a only •it .. aa, 
biMelf. Tbere 1• no conflict in tu , .. _ 
tillony of the two witneaaea. 
In addition to tbe fure101n1 tbe 
state'• witneaa teatifi•d tbat be oalled 
' 
the defendant about a week after tbe 
typewriter waa to be returned or another 
payment •ade and the defendant alle1edlJ 
stated he would be in un Saturday to paJ 
another aontb'• rent or return the t•pe-
•riter (R 7-8). The witness testified 
tbat defendant did not co .. 1n on latur-
daJ so on Monday be went out to bi• boae, 
••rified defendant was li•ins there, and 
aearcbed tbe hOll8 for tbe tJpewriter at 
tbe iavitatioa of defendant'• r001111ate, 
but was .mable to find the t•pe•riter. 
(a. 8). The •itne•• also went out to ta.. 
~uain••• adclre•• but found it locked (I. 9). 
Be verified tbat clefelldant bad a plaoe..;;of 
business there and be peered ln tbe wtndoWa 
obaerYina sign paintina .. teriala and sup-
plies (wbicb bad tbe appearance of bavins 
been U11ed) (R. 13-14), but he did not see 
the typewriter altbou1b be adaittedly ••• 
5 
not able to see into every conceivable 
place 1t may have been stored (R. 14-15). 
In addition to tbe foreso1n1 tbe 
State's witness made two phone calls. One 
he made a few days or a week after tile Yi&it 
to defendant'• bOIUI (R 8). Thia phone oall 
was aade to defendant'• boae, but defendant 
wasn't there (R. 8). The witneaa alao 
phoned the Freeport Center after peering in 
the windows and asked tbea if tbare waa a 
typewriter there to •bich they replied tlwJ 
would check (R. 13-14). On one otlaer oc-
casion tbe witness went a aaa out to ••• if 
be could find tb• defendant at bis residence 
but be was not aucceaaful (R. 8), and the 
tppewriter has never bean returned (B. 10). 
The defendant teatified tlaat be 
didn't recall whether anyone ever ooataoted 
bia in reaarcls to the typewriter, but lie 
ackaowledc•• be knew be bad tile dut7 to 
8 
see that it was returned (R. 31 and •1-
42). He testified that be had soae youn1 
aen associated in this Yenture, une by 
the llaae of Danny Buckley (R. 23). One 
day when it appeared things weren't 10101 
too well with the buaine•• the defendant 
put the typewaiter in one of the boy'• 
car with whoa Danny rode and instructed 
hi• to return it (R. 2•-as and 37). Re 
doe•n't recall whether he specifically 
iu true ted Dan·ny where the t1pewr1 ter waa 
to be returned but he teatified that there 
••• nu a1sunderstandins of where it waa to 
go (E. 39). Danny also had aoae drattinar 
equipment which belonsed to so .. one other 
tban defendant (R. 27). Soaet11le after 
defendant bad delivered tbe typeJrriter to 
Danny and after the busines• waa defunct 
be approached Danny and asked hi• to re-
turn the drattin1 eqaipaent but Dann1 re-
7 
fused, claia!ng d~tendant owed bia and 
the other boy• llOney tor tbe work tbeJ bad 
done (R. 27-28 and 38-39). There wu a 
h~at@d argument about the equipment and 
d@fendant left e•pty banded (R. 39). Be 
neYer bad occasion at that tilta or later 
to agatn tbink about the typewriter until 
h• was arreeted (ft. 25,21, 30, and 39). 
The State'• wtta••• testified 1i wae 
about a aontb and a week atter the or111na1 
r•ntal that be unsuccessfully atteapted to 
contact the defendant ahout the tJpeWSt1,er 
(R. 7, 8, and 9). Tb• defendant teatified 
that about two aoatllll after reat1n1 tbe 
typewriter be aoved to California (R. 32) 
where he was •ubSequentlJ arrested (R. 18-
19), and where h• bad been uaina b18 cor-
rect naae (R. 20). It was about three 
weeks or a aonth prior to this that be 
gave the typewriter to Danny (R. 32 and 17). 
8 
This would be about the aaae ti•e the 
rental •iree•ent expired and the State's 
•itness was atteaptin1 to contact the de-
fendant. 
lt waa on the ba•i• of the foreioiJll 
Evidence that tbe Trial Court found the 
de1enclant guilty. 
POIITS RELllD UPOlf 
Point I. The Evidence Waa I118ufficient 
to Support a 11nd1n1 Tbat 
Defendant'• failure to Return 
tbe Typewriter Waa Willful. 
A. Tbe Trial Court Brred in lail-
inc to Grant Defendant'• Motton 
to D1a•1a• at the Cloae of tbe 
State '• Ca11e • 
B. Tbe Trial Court Erred in Findilll 
tbe Defendant Guilty at tbe ClOlle 
of all the EYidence. 
Point II • A Typewriter is nut one of the 
Tb1n19 Included in the Statute 
Wbicb Create• Cri•inal Liability 
tor Willfully fa111DS to Return 
Certain S~e.1ilett .Tbj:s~s. 
9 
AROUllBNT 
Point I~ The Bv1dence Wu Inat.dtict•nt 
to Support a Finding That 
D9feadant Willfull{ Jailed to 
Re.turn the !7pewrl er. 
A. The Trial Court nrred in Fa11-
1q to Grant Defendant'• llo'iOD 
to D1B•iss at tho Close of the 
&tat•'• caae. 
Becauae tbe lAli•la ture expreul7 
atated that one of tbe el ... nt• of tile 
crille of wbich Defendant ts conYioted 1• 
a willful failure, the &tat• bae tile bur-
den of provins beyond a reaaona~le doubt 
tba t tbe Defe11daat '• failure is willful. 
See 
state v. Lari•, 78 Utah 183, 
2 p 2d 243, 2'9 (1931); 
20 All. Jur. Evidence Sec. 
134 and 149 (1939). 
The State therefore auat preaent auff1c1-
ent evidence from wbicb. the flt~t finder caa 
find that Defendant'• failure 1• willful. 
Tb• reoord ber• coataiu no direct eYidenoe 
10 
.ADDITIORAL A'DTllORITJBB TO DD'B11>.Aft 
Dlf D'SPPD'B UDF 
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Tbe bett•r reaaoned ca••• bold tbat de-
feadaat, bJ going forward wltll bi• on ••1-
denee, did aet wa1Ye bi• clai• of error pre-
dicated upoa ti.. itrial Co111"t'• r•f-1 to dia-
•1•• at tbe ••• of tbe State'• eaae. 
Cepbu w. United Stat••, eM 
F. Id 893 (D.C. Cir. 1113). 
ltat. •· Baoheller, 89 x • .r.L. 
'33, G•, 18 A. 819, 130 (X.J. 
8up. Ct. 1118). 
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that Defendant'• failure waa •illlul. 
Therefore, it becoaee nec .. aarr to exa-
•1ne t.be record to detenaine if tbere ••• 
aay ••1dence presented by &he State ta 
tbeir case froa wbich a fact f 1nder could 
inter tbat tbe failure waa willful. 
"WilltullJ" 1• defined bJ the IA•iW-
lat-=e tor purpoeea of tJae Penal Code at 
Bect1oa 78-1-3, u.c.A. (1813). 
Therein it 1• stated tut "wtll:fullJ" 
• . • i•pliea alll~lJ a pur-
poae or w1111ncnea• to cOll-
•i t tbe act or uu tlMI oata-
aion referred to. It do•• 
not require any intent to 
Yiolate law or to injure ano-
ther or to acquire an1 ad•an-
tage. 
While the laat eentenoe quoted above i• 
helpful in detena1n1na wllat "•1111111.lJ" 
doe• not .. an, we aullllit that the clefi-
. -
nition proY1ded by t~• L•a1slatui·e 1• aot 
very helpful in detera1niug what it doe• 
ll 
aeaa. To say that "willfullJ" 1apl1•• 
a •1llinsnes• is less clear than to 
••relJ say "willfully" aeana willfully. 
To ••1 that it iaplie• a purpoee 1• not 
auo• 110re helpful. 
The United State• Supreae Court baa 
defined willful. It bae said: 
"lWJhen uaecl in a a~ta1nal a ta-
tute it generally aeans an act done 
wi tb a bad purpose. . • •1 thout J•-
t!fiable exouae .•• stubbornl1, 
obstinatel1, perversely .••• 
(Citations oattted.) 
United State• v. Murdock, 290 
U.S. 389, 394, 78 L. Ed. 381, 
385 (1933). 
Tb• court further explained tbe aeania1 of 
willful aa followa: 
"Here we are concerned with a 
atatute wbicb denouaoea a willful 
fa!lure to do vari~us thin .. thought 
to ~· requisite to a proper adaini•-
tration of the inco .. tax law and tbe 
Qonrnae11t in tbe trial below, we 
think correctl7, •~•uaed that it car-
ried the burden of abowiq aore tbaa 
a aere voluntar1 failure to supply 
iafor11atton, with intent, in 1ood 
12 
faith to exercise a privilege grRn-
ted the w:t tneas by the ConLtitution. 
The respondent 'e refusal to answer 
was intentional and Without lepl 
just1-ficatton, but the jury aight 
nevertheleas f tnd that 1t waa not 
prompted by bad faith or evil in-
tent, which the statute .. kes an 
eleaent of the otf•nae." 
Id. at 397-398 and 388-387. 
Tbe Utah 8upre•e Court bas apparently 
never defined "•illfully" as used in the 
statutory provision With which we are now 
concerned. However, in a case 1nvolv1QS 
the 1nt@rpretat1on of the Worklaan•s Coa-
peuation Act tblS Court, adoptiq the de-
finition& placed on the phrase by tbe Okla-
bo .. , Kansas, and Tenneaeee CourtB, d~fined 
''willful failuro" a• follows~ 
.lt7he term "willful failure," 
. . : was beld to aean, not aere-
ly voluntary and intentional, but 
to carry •itb it the idea of pre-
•edi ta tion, obBtinacy, and inten-
ttgnal wrongdoing. . . . 
"LWJ1llful failure'' 1• not 
necessarjly fulfilled by voluntary 
13 
and intentional oaJssion, but in-
cludes the eleaent o:f intractable-
ness, tht> headstrong disposition 
to act by the rule of contradiction .. 
il'iillful failure aeanE!.7. • • 
something more than negl1~ence and 
carrying the idea of deliberation 
and intentional wrongdoing." 
Western Clay •Metals Co. v. 
Industrial COJ1aiss1on, 70 Utah 279 
259 Pac 927,928 (1927.) 
Certainly if 0 w1llflll" as it describes 
failure, 1~ defined to aean ~<>11etbing •ore 
than merely intentional or voluntary tor 
purposes of a civil action. then it •ust 
likewise be so defined where it constt-
tutea an ele•ent of a crime, taking into 
consideration the require•~nt of strict 
construction of cri•inal statutes and the 
parftaount~ot innocence which 
continues throughout the trial of ever1 
criainal case. 
State v. Dickson, II Utah 2d 8 
3ol P.2d 412 (1961). And 
14 
See 
Baylor v. State, 208 8. w. 
3d 553 (Texas Ct. Cria. App., 
1948)' 
which holds that a statutory presuapttoa 
ot intent to COIUlit ftn offense should be 
strictly construed for the reasons .. n-
tioned. 
HoweYer, •••n if we aesuae for the 
mo•ent that the phrase "•illfullJ fail•" 
aeans nothing 110re than "intentionally 
fail•", we contend that tbe State did not 
pre•ent a "prtaa.facia" case before reettas. 
Certainly, if tb• State ltaa the burden of 
pro•tns an intentional overt act, all tlae 
proaecution need do 1~ proft tbe act aad 
the fact finder can infer the intent be-
ca use "It ts a lega 1 pres •l)t ion of law 
that every •an 1ntencla tbe n•c••••rJ and 
natural or probable consequence• of bi• 
Yoluntary act. " . . . 
15 
I Wharton, Cr Utiual Law ~htc. 147 
(12th ed. 1932); 
(But See. 20 All Jur, RY1dence Sec. 333 
(193), wherein this saae rule is announced 
but quAlif ied where the criae requires a 
willful doine, stating in such a ca•• that 
"a specific wrongful intent aust be 111bown. ") 
Tbis 1• conaistent with the rationale ot in-
ferential eYidence as expressed by the fol-
lowing authorities: 
A prest.lllption cannot ordinarily 
be raised froa aoae fact proved un-
less a rational cunneotion ex1ats 
between such fact and the ~ltiaate 
fact pre&Ulled. • • • ~47 fact can 
be regarded as tbe basia of an in-
ference oaly where tbe inference 1• 
a probable or natural explanation 
of the fact. Inferenoea .. , not be 
drawn froa one transaction to ano-
tber wbicb 1• not apec1f ically coD-
nec ted with it, aerel7 because the 
two reseable each other, but auet 
be linked together by the chain of 
cause and effect a11d comaon experi-
ence." 
16 
20 Am. Jur. Evidence Bee. 159 
(1939). 
"L'I]be coocluoion !Which cau be 
1011cally ch•awn froa the direct 
evid€ r!c~l is \.Jue derived ay the 
aid& oi exPttrience and rea~on fro• 
the cunaection between the fact$ 
which are knuwu and t!aat which 1a 
uaknvwo •••• fi.lhe inference 1s 
.. de by virtue ut preYious ex&Mri-
e nce of the cuunection between the 
kouwn and tlae cli11puted facts • • • • 0 
l l!gauru, bVideuoe Sec. 25 (3d 
ed. 1940) quot in~ :troa l ii tarkie, , 
Evidence 13 (1824). 
Huwever, the mere fact that a pereoa 
fa..!!.!_ to pttrfor• au act cloea oot, •• aub-
•1 t, infe1~ tlla t ·be intendt1d the failure. 
And, even aore clearly, it does not infer 
that the fail.are was willful. That ia 
(applying the test• •et forth bJ tile above 
quoted authorities) ua1nc "the aidll of ex-
perience and reason .. we ~nnot assume tbat 
because a pereon tail• to retara propert1 
be bas a duty tu return that the failure 
was willful; there is 110 "rational con-
17 
nectiunu between li>Uch a failw:e anc1 a 
Willful &tale uf a~od; a willful state 
of ailid itd nut a "prubable or ua turnl 
explana i..luu uf U1t1 fact" of tbe failure. 
lt is just as roas.ouable to preaU11e that 
the property was debtroyed, lost, ur sto-
leo. It is juat as 1•ea1iouahle to pr•suae 
that the per~ou ~harK•d w~th the uuty .. t 
with au accident before he cuuld pertora. 
It is ju~t as rensoaable tu pre&uae that 
he juwt plaiu forgot. Aa •tated bJ the 
Nu one will be proauaed to ac' 
in wanton and/or willful ciiare6{ard 
of the rishts of otherM .••• 
No one is preauaed to bave cri-
aiua l •nteat aor ta be mut1vateu 
by iat•nts and purposes which w~uld 
couvict bi• of iavoluntary criae. 
Lipsco•b v. News ~tar World 
Pub. Cgrp. 5 So 2d 41, 45 
(La., 1941) 
li 
r.t:' ::,ubait that th.: add:itlonal fact 
tel.:i Lt.l .Lt!ri to bj tlw Sta le• s wi ttH~ss, tba t 
hto waa never .;;uccessful in locating ei·-
ther the Left:ndaut <>r th£• t)lpewr.iter, add& 
no tb1n6 from which it can l.>t~ 1.nff:-rred that 
the Letenoant's iuilure to return the type.-
v.r1 ter -aas willful. We subait thzlt such 
meager ue6a tive evidence won• t even sup-
l,)ort :la inference that th<~ Defendant had 
clscout1aued hi~ busincsJ or left the area. 
Even if we could draw such an 1nfArence 
from this ev i de nee, it woult~ be res ting an 
inference oa an inference to huld that sucb 
an inf'ereuce supportf.:i the further intere1nc• 
tba t Defendant's failure was willful. 
Defendant respecttully submits that 
the trial c~urt erred in failing to &U8'ta1n 
bis mut1on to dismiss at the close of tbe 
Sta tu • s case . 
h. The Trial Court Erred in F1Dciing 
19 
the DE>fenda11t Gut lty at the 
Clo&e of All the Evidence. 
Assuaing the Stat~ did present suffi-
cient evidenct! frOll which the fact f incler 
could have found Defendant guilty, Defen-
dant ~ubmit~ that at tbe close yf hi• ease 
with no rebuttal evidence presented by the 
State, the fact finder could not have fouDd 
hi• ruilty as a matter of law. In effect 
Defendant here contends that had this .at-
ter been tried to a jury, Defendant wuuld 
have been entitled to a directed verdict 
after all of the evidence was in. 
The test of when a directed verdict 
ls appropriate is stated very clearly in 
tbe follow1u1 quotation fra11 
9 Wigaur•1, Evidence Sec. 2495 (3d 
ed. 1H40) 
quoting from 
Jerke v. Dolaont State Dank, ~4 
S.U. 446,223 N.W. 585 (19291: 
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"The only rule uf law invol-
ved llii that wbicb announceu that 
the judge will deteraine the aat-
ter witbvut the assistance of tbe 
jury~ wbeu reasonable •inds ap-
plied to the evidence could pro-
perly cuaf! to bfat one conclusion. 
1h• legal principle is s111ple, and 
the real question jn ev~ry case 1• 
not a question u1 law in any proper 
sense of the word, but is a ques-
tiun of logic, ur reason, or juq-
aent (how~v~r we aay chooae to 
phrase it), and it is in eacb ca•• 
a question tor the judge (or for 
the appellall cuurt, aa the caae 
aay be), and aust reaa1n such a 
question, re1ardle•• of tbe adait-
ted fact that there is no external 
standard or yardstick wber•bJ we 
aay deteraine •1th ... tbe .. tical 
preciaion what result reasonable 
atnds aust arrive at in the field 
of op10100 or~~dlll•nt by tae ap-
plication of their intellectual 
faculties \o certain 11ven data. 
The standard of reasonableness 1• 
aubjective, and it 1• &Ile a&aadard 
of the judge that •uat be used; 
prubably in the f ~nal ana),ai• t~• 
standard of tbe Court of last re-
•urt in any giveA jurisdiction; 
but the n~ture of deteraination re-
aains the aa••. WJaen a Court huldll 
in any given case or upon any given 
facts, tbat tba direction of a ver-
dict is proper, it is not in anf 
strict sense announcins a rule or 
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doctrine of law, but is aerely 
announcing its judgment or upio-
.icn as a matter of reasuo and lo-
gic that in tbat case and upun 
thosefaots reas~nable •1nd• could 
nut ditt~r as to the result to be 
reached." 
That saae case, as quuted by Wi111e>re, 
involYed tbe very issue wtth whl•k th1• 
Court is now faced; that is, tbe appropri-
ateness of direct101 a verdict in favor of 
a party who adduces uncorroborated evideaoe 
in the nature of testl•ony of a wttues• 
interested in the outco•e of the suit, 
which evidence i• not contradicted bJ anr 
direct evidence adduced by the oppoaiftS 
party. Ia tbat ca•• tbe part1 requeattns 
tile directed verdict oa the basis of such 
evidence, unlike the defendant in Uae ea•• 
now before the court, bad the ult1 .. te bUl'-
den of proof. In boldin1 that a directed 
verdict waa "hi&hlJ proper" in tbat cue, 
the court reasoned as follows: 
22 
"Our question fart her narrows 
to thif> thau: uua-ht a judge to 
say, as a matter of reason and 
judgment, that the mere tact tnat 
a witness 1$ interested in the 
matter in cuntroversy, in and of 
itself, without regard to other 
circUJllStauces of the case, aakes 
it reasonable to diabelieve or to 
fail tu belic:vc hiai te:atimuuy, in 
the light of general ht.man experi-
ence) we do not believe tba t any 
Court bas gone so far as to lay 
down aoy ~ucb doctrine, ur enunci-
ate any such ~eneral principle, 
whether it be v1eweo a:ri a aatter 
of law, ur as a aatter of logical 
rationaiJ.aation. Tb• sound view 
aeeas to us to be thia; That each 
case aust dupend upon its uwu 
facts, and that the aere fact of 
iotere~t in the cuntrover~y due~ 
not in and of itself, and apart 
troa other circuawtanceM appear1ns 
in the caso, render it a reasonable 
thing to a1sbelieve tile testiauny 
of ~ witness wboa otherwise it 
would be unreanunable to di.abelieve, 
and tlis, we think, 1• the estab-
lltibed practice of the great aaju-
rity of courts. 
"Upon principle, therefore, and 
upon the authurities, and upon ib• 
previous practice of this Court, we 
ar~ ~atisfied that we erred in the 
former opinion in adopting, either 
expressly or by iaplication, the 
doctrine of the Massachusetts Court 
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that testimony of au interested 
'fli tnesb always aud of necess.i ty 
•akea a ju1·y q'1eStion And we 
arc ~a~~sf iea that thci b~tter 
vtew, as well aa the one accord-
in~; WJ. th the prnviuus prt.ctice 
of this Court, is that the rule 
vf rea$onable judgaent aust be 
appliea to each ease upon its 
particular facts; and, if the 
te&tiaony 1n behalt ~f the party 
having the burden of pruot is 
clear ana full, not extraordi-
nary or incredible in tbe ligbt 
uf seneral experience, and not 
coutradicted, either airectly 
or indirectly, by other witne•-
ses, ur bJ circumatances dta-
closeo, and ts so plain and eoap~ 
lete that disbelief therein could 
not arise by rational procP.sses 
applied to tbe evidence, but 
would be whiasical or arbitrary, 
then, and in such caae, it is not 
onlJ peraiastble, but highly pro-
per. to direct a verdict, and tbe 
direction of such verdict should 
not bo prevented .. rely by rea-
son of the fact that one or aore 
of the witnesses are 1ntereated 
14 the transnctiun or tbe result 
of the suit." Ibid. 
Our sister •tate of Wyom1ns bas re-
cently enunciated tbe a••• doctrine 1n a 
criminal case ldentical in principle &o 
the one uow before tb~s court. la tllat 
ca~1~, like the case at bar, the state re-
l1ed ou a mere iufercnce uf the acouaed'a 
intent as aga1n¥t the testimony of inte-
rested witnesaeH. The accused was convic-
ted of sucond degree aurdor whiob required 
a showing that the h\MIOC1de was both pur-
posely and aallciously comaitteu. Upun 
appea 1, the defeudaut contend1n1J the ev1-
dence was 1nsuff icient t~ uustain n verdict 
of second degree mw-der, the Supre1!le Court 
of Wyomine: reduced the conviction to -n-
slaughter reasoning a~ follows a8 to the 
J.ns tant issue: 
Where an accused is thf! sole wit-
n~ss of a transaction charged a.a a 
crime, as in the case at bar, bia 
testiaony cannot be arbltrsril7 re-
jected, and if bis credibility ha• 
aot been iapeackecl, and bi.a t•• ti-
mony i~ not laprobable, and i• not 
incondistent with the facts aDd 
c1rcua$tance~ shown, but is reasea-
ably consistent therewith, tb•n his 
testimony should be accepted. Ea~an 
v . state·, :sa Wyo. 16 7 , l.aB i>. ~d ~us, 
226. 
Inferences oontrar1 to direct 
test11ton1 are not ordinarilJ aut-
f icient to aupport a findina. Bene., 
in the absence of concerte ewtclence 
on the part of the au'• to allow in-
tent, and in the abeence of an7tbtna 
to contradict or .tapeacb the teati-
aoa1 of defendant and bis wife, there 
can be no preauaptlon of law on 1•-
te n t. ltate v. Panael1, supra. Tile 
state therefore failed to prove tbat 
tile ktlliaa of MoCullua ... purpoaelr 
done bJ •un•• 
•un•• Y. State, 383 P2d 728, Tit 
<•ro 1963). 
Tile Dtab lupre• Court earlr acloptefl 
tbe poa1t1on that a f1ncl1as of faot oould 
not be • upporte·ct onl1 It)' an iaferell08 coa-
trar1 to direct evidence, ezpreaai .. tu 
poaitioa in tbe follo•iDS laquap: 
Wlaea f indiop of tile trial eout 
are t.•ed .. relr upon a preaumptioa 
of fact, aa in tb1• oue, ud the 
preauaption 1• entirelJ d1••1pated, 
tben there i• no nld.eue ia aupport 
of tile findinp, and beaoe, aa laeld 
in 8 ta te Y. Brown, 38 Utall, •1, 1.0%. 
Pac. 841, 2' L.R.A. (K.8.) 145, tbe 
•ue•tion ia .. relJ one of law. 
Lelaod v aourne, •1 Utab 121, 
125 Pac. Ill, 116-857 (1112). 
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At this point Defendant reapectfullJ 
urae• tile Court to carefully re-exaaine 
hi• teatiaony as tranacribed for tbe re-
cord. We aublait that bi• teattaon1 
.•. is not taprobable, and 1• 
not 1ncoaa1atent with the fact• and 
circumstance• abown, but is reaaon-
ably conaiatent there•itb. . • . 
Bunez v. State, aupra. 
Bor was bi• cred1b111t7 iapeaobed in any 
particular. AB ataowa b7 tile record (R. aa... 
41 and 44-48) tbe State'• attorae7 Ol"oa&-
exaained the defendant with v11or, reault-
ins only in a clarification aact re-eapbaai• 
of bia direct teatiaonJ tlaat be delivered 
poaaeaaion of the t7pewr1ter to one of the 
boJ• who waa asaootated with bi• in the 
abortive venture and wbo fullJ 11&deratood 
that tbe typewriter waa to be returned to 
b-•1•r'a (R. 39). 81• poor aeaor, of 
the detail• aurround1DS the reatal and re-
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turn of the typewriter are wholl1 oonaia-
tent with the fact tbat the occurrence wae 
15 aontlw old at the ti.Ile of tbe trial, 
and that at the tiae of the deliver1 of tbe 
typewriter to the boJ for return to Kalllae-
7er 's the defendant was "ba1r-on-end trJia1 
to f11ure •bat to do aext." (R. 37). 
Thia Court has at least twice reweraed 
the lower tribunal'• finding tbat tbere ••• 
a "willful failure" to perfona a recautretl 
aot where the onlJ evicleace adcluoecl ia au~ 
port of eucb a findina was an iafereaoe 
rai•ed bJ circU11Btantlal ewidence contra27 
to tbe direct eYidence add.aced bJ tbe op-
poein1 party. It appeara in both ot tlaeae 
cases, altbouab tk• Court cloean•t explioitlJ 
so atate, that tbe ••iclence relied upon 1IJ 
tb1• Court in 0Yerturnin1 the lower trlbu-
na l '• findiD11 ••• uncorroborated ewldenoe 
adduced by intereated witneaaea. 
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Tbua ina proceeding befure tbe Jad•-
trial C011111saioa wherein the injured ••-
ployee succeaafullJ aaaerted a cla1a for 
an iacreaae ot 15 percent in tbe a11aunt 
nor-llJ awarded upon IJ"Ollnda tbat tile 
eaplo1er willfully failed to coaplJ •ltb 
a lawful order of tile C011111••1on, tbla 
Court uld tbat tbe eaployee'• ••ideaoe 
tr• wbicb t1ut Coma1••1on bad inferred tile 
willful failure waa 1nauffic1ent la Yie• of 
tbe uncontradicted eYldence adduoed _, tlae 
eaplo1er tlaat a ·carpenter bad IMea dlreoted 
to coa11truct the ••1••1 cleY10• ~ut ... cle-
l&J•cl beoauae o:f lack of • t•r1a la • 
Weatern Clay• .. tala Co., 
•. lncbulh'ial eo-1u1oa, ..199 
utab 279, aae Pao. 917 
(Utah 1927). 
In a •lllilar earlier o••• tbia Court 
a1a1a re•eraed an order of lb.a lad .. ,rial 
Comaisaion for additional coapeaaatioa 
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holding that there was not any coapetent 
substantial evidence to support their 
findini that the eaployee'a injuries were 
caused bJ the willful failure of his ea-
plo7er to comply with C01111isa1on regula-
tions. The evidence did clearly show a 
failure to coaply with such re1ulat1ona, 
but in coaaenting on the evidence tile 
Court said: 
It is ar1ued ~Y the Asaiatant 
Attorney General, on bellalf of 
the C01111i•sion, tbat whether or 
not the failure ot the eaployer 
to coaply with tbe order of the 
C011111••1on ••• willful J.a a quee-
tion of tact, and tlaat the Coa-
aiaaion'• tindina upon tbat aatter 
is conclusive and bindin1 upon ua. 
Orclinar 1 ly • it UJ be conoeded 
tbat an inquiry as to wbetber the 
acts of an eaployer are willful 
and done in diaregard of the sta-
tute or an order of the C01111isalon 
leads to the determination of a 
question of tact. But where there 
is no confliotiDC teetillony in the 
record, and where there 1• no dl•-
pute reapectlng the facta found bJ 
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the cu .. iasivn or additional 
tacts delineated by the wit-
nesses, the aatter then ~ecoaea 
a question of law. Jo re Riley, 
227 Mass. 56, 116 I.E. 259. 
Pork Utah Mining Co. v. 
Iaduatrial C01111iaa1on, 82 
Utah 421, 220 Pac. 389 (1923). 
for tbe foregoina rea&ollli we aubait 
that tbere is no evidence in the record 
sufticieot to convince reasonable a1ncla 
beyond a reasonable doub' tbat defendant'• 
failure to return the t7pewr1ter, if 1n 
fact it was not returned, waa willful. 
Point II. A TJpe•riter i• oot One 
of the Tbinp Included 
in the Statute Wbiob 
Create• Crillinal LiabllitJ 
for WillfullJ Fa111n1 to 
Return Certain Specified 
Thinp. 
Ta...tatute allesedlJ violated bJ De-
fendant provide• tbat an1 person •bo renta 
or leases "a aotor vehicle, trailer, ~P21J... 
ance, equiP!!ent, tool or otber YAlua~le 
tbiy," and fails to return tile ••• •1tlU.n 
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ten days after the rental aareeaent baa 
expired i• guilty of eabezzleaent. (Ba-
pbasis added.) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 
76-17-5 (Supp. 1985). 
Pursuant thereto Defendant was cursed and 
convicted of willfully tailiDC to return a 
rented typewriter w1th1o tllllvPll*6dCL~­
t1oned. Herein Defendant urtstia t..bat a 
t1pewriter 1a not ou of tile tlli- inclu-
ded i'a the ..._. quoted pbraae . 
•hen cou trued in tbe lipt of tra-
d1 t1oDAl rule• of etatutor1 conatruotlon, 
the correatoe•• of Defendant's poeition .la 
.. de clear. The rule• to which we refer 
are the rule tba t penal 11 ta tutes shall be 
strictly construed, the rule of noac1tur a 
aooiia ( 0 it is known froa it• aaaociatee") 
and the rule of ejusde• generis ("of tlae 
saae I.ind"). 
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As to the rule uf ~trict cuDMtruction 
it is saJ.d; 
SO Ali JUR Statute• Sac. 4Us: 
/"~enal statutes are aot to be 
extended ia their operation to 
peraollfl, things ur acts not with-
in their deacript1ve ter•, or the 
fair aud clear illpurt of the laaauace 
used ..•• Whatever is not plainly 
Within tbe proviaiona of a penal 
statute abould be reaarded as With-
out its intendaeot. • •• 
This pbiloaophJ f illda expre••1oa ia 
this Court as follows: 
.•. where a statute claargea oae 
•itb a dut1 ur iapoeea a burden or 
a penalty, it awat do so with autfi-
cieot claritJ and cie11oitene•• tllat 
one of ord1aary intelliaenoe will 
understand wbat he 1a required to do. 
Rinawood Y. State, a Utah Id 
287, 333 P2d 943 (1819). 
The rul•~ of noscitur a aocii• and 
ejuadea 1enet1a are be• t explaioecl bJ .J•-
tice Crocktttt: 
Tbe rule of noscitur a aoc11•, 
literally "it 1• knowa fro• it• 
aaaociat••," requtr•• tbat the 
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•eaning of doubtful words or 
phrases be deteratned in tbe 
light of and take their char-
acter froa associated word& or 
phrases. Sutherland in bis 
treatise on Statutory Construc-
t ion s ta tfls = " • • • where two 
or •ore. words are grouped toge-
th~r and ordinarily have a simi-
lar meaning, but are not equally 
compr~hflnsiv~, th~ general words 
will be lia1ted ~nd qualified by 
thfl special words." 
Another closely related rule 
which is universally accepted ae 
val id ts that of ejuede• sener is , , 
aeaning "of the saae kind", which 
rule is that: when general word8 
or teras follow specific ones, the 
1aneral must be understood as ap-
plying to things ot the saae kind 
as the specific. 
These are, of course, neither 
artificial nor arbitrary rules but 
arise quite naturally froa the pro-
cess of reasoning as to what the 
statute was intended to aean. Cotl-
llOD sense and experience teach that 
when a group of related things are 
specif 1cally enuaerated, the mind 
ts focused upon that class of th1D19, 
and that the addition of general 
terms is purposed to avoid inadver-
tent omission and to include like 
things of the same class. tn accord 
with this is the fact that if the 
broadest aeanlng of the 1enerai ••-
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pression were intended, it 
would liave been' su!ftcieni" 
6y l tself withmit any use of 
tn~ speclt1c ter... tlaphi•1• 
aClded.) 
Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 
2d 368, 37' P2d 839 (1962). 
It hardly requires •ent1on1ac to cll'aw 
attention to tbe fact that a typewriter 1• 
not a aotor vehicle or a trailer. 
Conceivably a typewriter could be con-
sidered as an appliance, an itea of equip-
aent, or a tool, ua1a1 those tel'Btll ln tlle1r 
broade• t sen•• . Bowe Yer, • acb a broad de-
finition of tho•• tel'llll would aoi be ooaai•-
tent with the requir ... nt• of clarity and 
definiteness alluded to in tbe Rin1woocl case, 
supra. Nor would such a coDBtructioa be 
consistent with the doctrine of no11citur a 
socii•. Wben tlae Maainp of "appliance," 
"equi19ent" and tttool" are conaidere4. in tlae 
lisht of the aore apecif 1c teraa "aotor vebl-
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clen and. "trailer" as required bJ that 
doctrine, their scope becomes clear. What 
is idcluded within those teras are thin19 
of a ~ature generally associated with aotor 
vehicles and trailers. Excluded are those 
things which mi~ht be considered appliaDcea, 
equipaeut, or tools in the broadest ...... 
but are wholly unrelated to aotor Yehicle• 
aud trailers. A typewriter is clearlJ not 
included. 
Of course, a typewriter is a "•aluable 
thing" if it bas· any value at all, and De-
fendant oertainly is not contendiAS tbat 
Lile typewriter in question had uo Yalue. 
However, had the Legislature aeant to ia-
clude every valuable thin& within the tel'llll 
of the statute when it said "other 't'alua-1• 
thinp," it would b••• been aufficient to 
use that phrase ,, itself without ADJ uae 
of the spec1f ic ter .. aa pointed out 1D tlae 
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Beatbaan case, supra. Applying tbe doc-
trine of ejusdea genesis as applied 1n 
that ca111e, it beooau clear tJaat the plaraae 
"uther valuable thina" includes only 110tor 
vebilces and trailer•, and appliance•, 
equiJ*eut, and tool.a of a nature generallJ 
associated with aotor vehicle• and tralle1'8. 
lt is clear tbat the pbraee as so uaed doe• 
not include a wholly unrelated tb1DC - a 
typewriter. 
CONCLUSION 
Aaaordin111. it 1• reapecttullJ ur,.d 
tbat th• judiP19nt and convtction of tbe 
trial court be re•••••d and tbe Defendant 
b• order~d discharged trOll custody. 
Reapectfully subllitted _,, 
FRAJfK s. WARSBR, A••oei•t• of 
YOOtfG, THATCBHR • GLAlllAJDI 
lOli 1'1nt SecuritJ aank 81q. • 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorne1• for Defendant aad 
Appellant 
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ADDITIOJIAL AlJTJIOJtITIU TO DD'BDAIT 
DX IDPPBR'S BltJD' 
TD STATS OF VTB -••- DJI DEPn& 
C&M Ito. 10914 
Tlae proper applioatioa Qf tlae ..iea ef 
•j•de• s•neris au aoeoitur a aooti• to tM 
atatut-*7 fl%OV1a1o.a in 41uatioa n,111n a 
coutruetion -lUitli•s a ._.writer, ,,... 
it• operat1oa. 
State Laacl Board 'f'. State De,.rtlleat 
of i' i•ll aatl - , 17 UtaJa N llT, 
408 P2d 707-(1961). 
(Tai• oaae ap~ar• to be '11'••t1J 
ooabu., to th• ••Pili Plaater 
oaae eited on pal• 15 of ID 
State'a IWief .) 
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